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The Scientific Technological Revolution 
Soviet Views, Yesterday and Today1
by
Jeffrey L Roberg with Roger E Kanet
Since the Second World War rapid industrial growth has swept the developed countries of the northern 
hemisphere In the Soviet Umon analysts have attempted to explain this rapid industrialization within a 
theoretical framework referred to as theory of the Scientific Technological Revolution (STR) This article will 
deal with several issues directly related to the STR First how have Soviet leaders and analysts approached the 
fields of science and technology within the framework of the theory of STR9 Directly related to this what were 
the objectives of the USSR concerning the use of STR and how have science and technology been employed to 
achieve these objectives9 Second what explains the failure of the Soviet Union to implement successfully the 
objectives of the STR and to turn the achievements in Soviet basic science and technology into applied results 
during the 1970s9 Also has the nature of the problems of implementing science and technology been 
adequately identified and what, if anything is currently being done to resolve these problems9 Third and 
finally does the STR still exist as a theoretical construct9 If it does do the objectives of the STR remain the 
same as they were during the 1960s and 1970s9
As implied by the above comments the following commentary will focus on two distinct periods in the 
Soviet discussion and analysis of the Scientific Technological Revolution First we will examine the 
emergence of the concept and its implication for Soviet science and technology policy in the period pnor to 
1985 It was during the 1970s a urne of general euphoria concemmg the changing international co relation of 
forces that the USSR emerged internationally as a superpower and continued to make progress on the domestic 
front which provided a foundation for that emergence As we shall see Soviet leaders and analysts have been far 
less sanguine concemmg the attainment of international objectives and the status of science technology and the 
economy within the domestic realm
The Original Concept of the Scientific Technological Revolution
Before discussing the ways in which the Soviet Union has utilized the STR it is important to discuss the 
meaning of the term and die objectives that the scientific technological revolution has been expected to 
accomplish Soviet analysts have stated that the STR is a world wide phenomenon with favorable implications 
for the future of world society it will contribute to the ultimate downfall of capitalism while hastening the 
development of socialism Unfortunately Western analysts have found that Soviet literature contains not a 
single position concerning the nature and scope of the STR In general STR has been conceived of as the 
technological application of science as a direct productive force 12 Specifically Enk Hoffmann and Robbin 
Laird have identified six components of the Scientific Technological Revolution
1) The mergmg of the scientific revolution with the technological revolution
2) the transformation of science into a direct productive force
3) the organic unification of the elements of the production process into a single automated system 
whose actions are subordinated to general principles of management and self management,
4) qualitative changes in the technological basis of production which signify changes m man 
machine relations
5) a new type of worker who has mastered scientific principles of production and
1 The research for this article was supported by the Program in Arms Control Disarmament and Intemauonal Security of the 
University of Illinois at Uibana-Champaign through funds received from the John D and Catherine T MacArthur 
Foundation The paper is scheduled for publication in the journal Soviel Union
2 Enk P Hoffmann Soviet Views of The Scientific Technological Revolution World Politics voL 30 (1977 78) p 618
26) the shift from extensive to intensive development of the production process3
Soviet Marxism Leninism of the Brezhnev era described the STR as leading the Soviet Umon to and 
through the stage of developed socialism Developed socialism was viewed as a period during which the basic 
social and political institutions of socialism are adapted to the challenges raised by the STR It is by mastering 
and taking full advantage of the Scientific Technological Revolution that the socialist state will be able to attain 
developed socialism In practice this ideological formulation meant that scientific change would lead to 
development However blocking the economic and socio political development of the state are intervening 
factors which for their own specific reasons either do not desire this development or are intentionally or 
unintentionally slowing its emergence In fact, the STR is not a new concept for the leadership of the Soviet 
Union Lenin understood the importance of the STR and the concepts of revolution m science and 
technological revolution appeared m his writings 4 Writing m 1931 Nikolai I Bukharin also spoke about a 
technical revolutions Theoretical discussions of the links between science and the transition from socialism to 
Communism occurred during both the first and third five year plans introduced under Josef Stalin This 
theorizing was interrupted by Stalin s cult of personality during and after World War n
N A Bulganin became the first high level Soviet leader to use the phrase Scientific Technology 
Revolution m a speech at the July 1955 Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee Speaking about 
the energy of the atom Bulganin stated that we stand at the threshold of new scientific and technological 
revolution the significance of which far surpasses the industrial revolutions associated with the appearance of 
steam and electricity *
At the 24th Party Congress in 1971 the Party leadership announced that the task facing the Soviet Union 
was to organically fuse the achievements o f the STR with the advantages o f the socialist economic system 1 
It was also observed that the STR had social and economic consequences as a result of the displacement of labor 
by changing the role of humans m the system of productive forces In 1973 for example Vladimir G 
Marakhov wrote that the STR was a double edged weapon
It is not only that powerful means of destruction have been created on the basis of the 
achievements of the STR but also that even the peaceful development of scientific and technical 
progress and of the STR in particular brings with it both positive and in corresponding social and 
economic conditions negative results The latter are linked with the accelerating process of exhaustion 
of stocks of some useful minerals pollution of the environment high rates of industrial processing of 
oxygen the utilization of fresh water e tc8
Another danger of the STR was the possible creation of a technocratic consciousness among technical and 
economic elites which possibly would result m downplaying the class nature of the political and economic 
processes and emphasizing technological development for its own sake But the emergence of a dominant focus 
on technology was not seen as inevitable it was viewed as a potential threat the STR does not develop in a 
social vacuum and m turn exerts a powerful influence on the development of existing social relations 9 It was
3 Enk P Hoffmann and Robbin F Laird The Scientific Technological Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy (New York 
Pergamon Press (1982) pp 9 10
4 See Julian M Cooper “The Scientific and Technical Revoluuon in Soviet Theory m Technology and Communist Culture 
The Socio Cultural Impact o f Technology under Socialism edited by Frederic J Fleron Jr (New York Praeger Publishers 
1977) p 149
5 Cited in N I Bukharin Socialist Reconstruction and the Struggle for Technique (Moscow Cooperative Publishing Society 
of Foreign Workers in the USSR 1932) p 10 cited in Cooper “The Scientific and Technical Revoluuon p 151
6 N A Bulganin 8 Report to the July 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU Pravda 17 July 1955 p 2 
(emphasis added)
7 Materially XXIV S ezda KPSS (Moscow Politizdat 1971) p 51 cited in Cooper The Scientific and Technical 
Revolution p 146 (emphasis in the original)
8 Vladimir G Marakhov “Osushchnosti nauchno tekhmcheskoi revohutsn Obmen mnenuami Filosofskie nauki no 5 
(1973) p 90
9 See Hoffmann “Soviet Views of The Scientific Revolution p 624 The citation comes from B M Kedrov and S R 
Frolov Nauchno tekhnicheskaia revolititsua i solsial nyt progress (Moscow Pohtizdat, 1973) p 37
3asserted however that these problems could be overcome by strengthening social controls over the STR while 
using science to provide new long term solutions
The mam Soviet hope was that science and technology could be utilized to improve factory productive 
capacities and to raise the levels of Soviet economic and industrial growth According to John Thomas and U 
M Kruse Vaucienne Science was elevated to the status of a productive force m the new Party Programme at 
the 22nd Party Congress with the implication that it would play a more fundamental role as part of the 
material basis and not merely as an aspect of the superstructure ”10
Speaking in 1976 Chief Soviet ideologue Mikhail Suslov that the STR opened unseen possibilities m 
the use of science to master and protect the forces of nature and to solve social problems while simultaneously 
acting as the material preparation for Communist civilization ”n
Implementation of the STR
Various attempts were made to implement the objectives of the STR Unfortunately for the Soviet 
leadership these attempts sometimes had effects opposite to those desired The first effort to achieve the 
objectives of the STR mcluded the reorganization of the Academy of Sciences in 1961 when the Academy lost 
over 40 percent of its scientific establishments While the Academy had 240 research establishments m 1960 it 
retained only approximately 160 two years later The institutes that were taken from the Academy were those of 
applied research institutes this permitted the inshtutes of the Academy to focus on basic scientific development 
rather than on implementation 12 In the view of Loren Graham the institutes themselves played a positive role 
m the decision to remove the applied institutes John Thomas on the other hand believes that this decision was 
imposed on the Academy13 Following the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Plenum of 1962 
the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers issued a decree to reorganize the Academy with the purpose 
of developing the social and physical sciences as a means of improving technological and industrial progress and 
to identify new uses for existing technology that would strengthen the national economy 14
The failure of the reorganizations of 1961 and 1962 to exert a major positive impact on the Soviet economy 
resulted in a second attempt to achieve the objectives of the STR within die context of Prime Minister Aleksei 
Kosygin s economic reforms initiated in September 1965 These reforms granted a limited devolution of 
economic authority while simultaneously preserving a large measure of directive planning Kosygin s reforms 
were meant to mercase the operating powers of individual enterprises and institutes by granting them more 
independence in their everyday operations Controls on enterprises were reduced in 1965 two years later controls 
governing many of the applied research development establishments also were reduced It was hoped that these 
two reforms both related to the restructuring of incentives would allow institutes and enterprises to cooperate 
more effecuvely with one another m promoting scientific and technological advances But Bruce Parrott has 
noted that, enterprise directors were either unable or unwilling to protect their rights against ministerial 
incursions 15 As a result, decision making autonomy did not emerge and cooperative arrangements among 
Research and Development (R&D) establishments did not expand appreciably
A second important problem also surfaced for the granting of greater autonomy to the production and 
research enterprises actually produced an unexpected decline in the rate of technological progress As Parrott 
has noted, the 1965 reform inadvertently strengthened the impact of the existing financial disincentives [which 
existed within the Soviet economy] by reducing the central administrative pressure which had previously 
sustained the process of innovation ” As the reform became more widespread, the number of prototypes of new 
machines and instruments created each year fell off sharply as did the number of prototypes introduced into the
10 John R Thomas and U M Kruse Vaucienne “Soviet Science and Technology An Introduction Survey voi 23 no 1 
(102) (1977 78) p 13
11 Cited in Thomas and Kruse Vaucienne “Soviet Science and Technology p 12
12. See Loten B Graham The Role of the Academy of Sciences Survey voi 23 no 1 (1977 78) p 120 See also John 
Turkevich “How Science Policy is Foimed Survey voi 23 no 1 (1977 78) p 92
13 Graham The Role of the Academy of Sciences and Thomas and Kruse Vaucienne “Soviet Science and Technology
14 Bruce Parrott “Technological Progress and Soviet Politics Survey voi 23 no 2 (1977 78) p 51
15 Ibid
4production cycle Between 1965 and 1968 the percentage of new machines and equipment included m the output 
of nine major machine building branches of the economy dropped from 13 8 to 8 2 percent16
The failure of the Kosygin reforms led the Soviet leadership to create both complex research institutes and 
Scientific Production Associations” (NPOs) through the decree issued on 24 September 1968 These 
associations represented an attempt to create optimum ties between research institutes and production 
institutes ” in die words of Eugene Zaleski17 The task of a complex institute was to improve the technology of 
a specific sector of a ministry s production while the NPOs combined different research institutes and 
production units and were generally directed by a research institute ” By February 1976 more than 100 NPOs 
had been created as a means to encourage technological innovation throughout the Soviet economy Zaleski 
notes that innovation was also encouraged by the removal of administrative barriers not only among the 
various research institutes but also at different stages of the R&D process ”18 NPOs were more engaged in the 
innovation process than were the complex institutes Yet it is unclear to what extent the creation of the 
complexes and associations actually had the desired effect of increasing technological innovation within the 
Soviet economy
A third approach to the creation of optimum ties” between research and production institutes was the 
establishment of production associations which resulted in the subordination of most research organizations to 
industrial production units By the end of 1976 there were more than 3 000 such production associations m 
existence providing approximately 40 percent of total industrial production19
The last major reform introduced during the 1970s that related to efforts to improve technological 
innovation and to gain greater benefits from the scientific economic revolution was the attempt to introduce 
economic accountability (kkozraschet) at the branch level based on a decree issued on 2 March 1973 The decree 
provided for the abolition of main administrations of ministries and their replacement either by production 
associations or by industrial associations Though the industrial associations functioned on the basis of 
kkozraschet their production associations NPOs and enterprises retamed separate legal identity and 
accountability 20
In connection with the reforms mentioned above various systems of incentives were implemented in the 
effort to achieve the objectives of the STR Based on a decree issued m 1968 by the Central Committee of the 
CPSU and the Council of Ministers the source for funding incentives was changed The old methods of rewards 
had been based upon the number of projects completed by an enterprise The new method of determining 
economic incentives was based on the amount of the rewards on the return that R&D results yielded to both the 
consumer and the economy The 1968 the decree created three incentive funds The first gave bonuses to 
workers based on both the annual results achieved by their institutes and their own individual achievements A 
second fund provided for housing construction and repair as well as the financing of cultural organizations and 
services provided to workers The third fund resulting from the 1968 decree provided for additional investments 
in equipment, instruments and materials aimed at encouraging technical achievements and improvements in the 
quality of research 21
In addition to the incentive funds established in 1968 a second incentive system was tried it tied the 
salaries of scientists to the results of their research activities rath»- than to their pnor level of training that they 
might possess A G Orlov discussed this attempt at salary reform in his analysis of the new forms of material 
incentives introduced at various enterprises throughout the USSR for example those at the Karpov Institute of 
Physical Chemistry 22 According to Orlov the productivity of the institute rose rather dramatically after the 
introduction of the new salary system In 1969 the first year m which the policy was in force inventions
16 Ibid
17 Eugene Zaleski “R&D Planning and Financing Survey voi 23 no 2 (1977 78) p SI
18 Ibid
19 Ibid p 20
20 Ibid
21 Ibid  p 25
22. See A G Orlov “New Forms of Material Incentives for the Woik of Scientists and Scholars Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i 
pravo no 1 (1974) translated m Soviet Review voi 15 16 (1974 76) pp 3 19
5increased 2 2 times over the level of the previous year and the number of papers submitted for publication 
increased by 25 percent23 However any attempt to posit a causal relationship between the introduction of a 
new salary incentive system and the productivity of the institute is likely to be flawed First of all Orlov does 
not discuss the degree to which the number of inventions ” or research papers represent true additions to 
scientific or technological knowledge Moreover the inventions that came to fruition during 1969 may have 
been available a year earlier In sum the experience of the Karpov Institute and the impact of the new salary 
incentive system on technological innovation is not entirely clear
The Failure of the STR
Despite the various efforts made by the Soviet leadership to attain the objectives of the STR by initiating policy 
reforms the USSR failed to reach its objectives throughout the 1970s The reasons for this failure fall into 
three basic categories political constraints organizational impediments and economic factors Political 
constraints consisted first of all of the continuation by the CPSU of a policy that limited contacts between 
Soviet scientists and their foreign counterparts as well as placing restrictions on travel by most Soviet 
scientists A second political constraint stemmed from the lack of information available to Soviet scientists 
concemmg new developments occurring in their fields of research This factor led to the impossibility of or the 
massive delay m receiving information about materials published outside the USSR The system of 
distributing scientific information in the USSR came under strong criticism from Soviet scientists Although 
noted first in 1969 the following criticism applies as well to the recent past the core of the problem is 
the bad organization of our country s scientific information service—the delay m the movement of new ideas 
through the communication channels are unacceptably long It can reach and even exceed five years The 
major obstacle [responsible for the delay] is the absence of direct and regular contact with scholars abroad. 24
Another impediment to accomplishing the objectives of the STR resulted from organizational problems 
stemming from the lack of unified scientific command For every annual and five year plan the State 
Committee for Science and Technology (SCST) devises the top priority programs pursued by the Academy of 
Sciences as well as by the many research institutes and ministries Each of these actors possessed its own 
budget, personnel and facilities Organizational problems that occurred m the implementation of research 
programs included the lack of an umbrella organization to carry a project from the initial research stage to 
production under a smgle leadership The need for centralized leadership within the Soviet economic 
environment becomes clear when one recognizes that the entire R&D cycle is fragmented among diverse research 
institutes and production enterprises Indicative of this problem are the barriers between scientific institutes and 
industry Industrial ministries do not readily take up the innovative ideas of scientists nor do they carry out 
their own basic research and development Rather historically they have contented themselves with duplicating 
research work done elsewhere or with maintaining outdated machinery and production processes The Scientific 
Production Associations established in the 1960s to solve this problem of coordination did not succeed in part 
because of administrative barriers that divided the enterprises from one another and the research institutes from 
the production units One reason for the relative success in technological innovation m the military security 
area has been the existence of centralized command able to force coordination among R&D and production units 
in the military sphere
Other organizational problems have stemmed from the jurisdictional boundary disputes among three key 
actors in the Soviet economy—the Academy of Sciences the SCST and the production ministries The 
Academy of Sciences has been in conflict with the SCST because of the widespread view among Academy 
leaders that the State Committee had infringed upon the Academy s exclusive nght to make decisions concerning 
science as well as to oversee contacts with foreign scientists 25 At the same time the Academy also has been m 
conflict with the production ministries because of the former s loss of a substantial number of institutes and 
personnel which were transferred to the ministries during the early 1960s m the attempt to increase the
23 Ibid p 8
24 V V Natunor and Z M Mul chenko Naukometria (Moscow Nauka 1969) p 163 cited in Yakov M Rabkin “The Study 
of Science ” Survey voi 23 no 1 (1977 78) p 137
25 See Thomas and Kruse Vaucienne “Soviet Science and Technology p 4
6effectiveness of applied scientific research Thus the Academy of Sciences which favors basic science is often 
m conflict with the ministries which emphasize apphed scientific research
Another jurisdictional dispute has engaged the SCST and the ministries The State Committee is in charge 
of the implementation of scientific and technological innovations m the plants and institutes of the various 
ministries However the ministries have resisted the introduction of new technology since they are held 
accountable for the fulfillment of production quotas even during periods when new technology and new 
production equipment is being installed 26
The last jurisdictional dispute has been one between the all union and the republic level Academies of 
Sciences Their disputes revolve around the quality of personnel the size of budgets and the level of interaction 
with foreign scientists that the all union Academy of Sciences receives in comparison with that received by the 
repubhc level academies In addition some of the strams have been aggravated by tensions between different 
nationalities within the USSR
Another aspect of the organizational problems that have arisen to restrict the effecuveness of efforts to 
reform the process of technological innovation within the USSR concerns the formation of production 
associations Although these associations were supposed to be adopted industry wide by 1980 by 1977 there 
were already numerous complaints of footdragging in the creation and running of associations ,27 In fact the 
associations were never emplaced as originally planned A final set of organizational problems derived directly 
from the system of central planning As Thomas and Kruse Vaucienne note central planning results m low risk 
taking on the part of enterprise managers the lack of individual responsibility m the case of failure and the 
identification of scapegoats to be blamed m the case of serious errors 28 All of these behaviors are evident m the 
Soviet case
A third and final source of obstacles to successful implementation of the STR objectives was economic 
One major economic problem has been the absence of incentives for scientists and research institutes to be 
innovative Although as noted above senous efforts were made to introduce incentives they proved to be 
inadequate to motivate the majonty of the members of the scientific research community A second important 
economic problem touched on above in the discussion of organizational impediments stems from the use of a 
production quota system in establishing the reward system in industrial production This system in effect, 
penalizes unsuccessful innovation and raises fears among enterpnse managers that the implementation of new 
technology may result m a failure to fulfill quotas and thus a reduction in income for both management and 
workers
Policy Innovations in the Gorbachev Era
We turn now to an examination of the policies pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev since his elevabon to the 
position of General Secretary of the CPSU in spring 1985 The questions that emerge concern Soviet science 
and technology policy since 1985 and the objectives of policies associated with STR In his discussion of 
current Soviet science policy analyst Peter Kneen has noted that It is the added responsibility assigned to 
science together with the attempt to revitalize its institutions which distinguish the current leadership s science 
policy from that of its predecessors ”29 On the surface this objective seems no different from the objectives 
pursued previously in the attempt to bnng technological progress to the Soviet Umon But officials claim that 
the goal of revitalizing science m the USSR now differs because the Soviet Union can no longer rely on an 
increasing pool of workers to bnng about higher industrial production levels Yet as Kneen notes the current 
desire for the intensification of scientific research can be traced back to the 8th Five Year Plan30 At the 27th 
Congress of the CPSU m 1986 Gorbachev also spelled out what he believed to be the practical responsibilities 
of Soviet scientists He noted that the Soviet leadership s commitment to strengthening support for science was
26 Ibid p 5
27 See Keith Bush “Soviet Economic Growth Past Present and Projected Survey voL 23 no 2 (1977 78) p 11
28 Thomas and Kruse Vaucienne “Soviet Science and Technology p 19
29 Peter Kneen Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev Soviet Studies voi 41 no 1 (1989) p 67
30 Ibid See also Cooper “The Scientific and Technical Revolution in Soviet Theory p 146
7made on the assumption that it would be paid back handsomely m discoveries and inventions that will 
revolutionize production ”31
Writing m 1986 Soviet analyst Gennadii Dobrov stated that the entena for the selection of goals for the 
Unified State Policy for Science and Technology (EGNTP) are the same as they were 70 years ago The policy 
was created m order to utilize the forces of science for their greatest contnbution to society and represent a set of 
coordinated directives established to accomplish three goals
1 the selection of such goals for scientific and technological activity as will serve the interests of the 
nation as a whole
2 the proper formation and smooth development of work force and
3 improvement of the organizational and economic links between science and industry and 
widespread dissemination of scientific and technological achievements throughout the country 32
Dobrov continues that, although the development of fundamental research would receive high pnonty applied 
research would be emphasized Applied Soviet science would be expected to develop new technologies to be 
introduced into the production process33
The problem currently facing the Soviet Umon is one of utilizing the enormous scientific and technological 
potential now at the disposal of the country Through the mid 1980s each year approximately five percent of 
the national mcome was allocated to scientific development Approximately five million Soviet scientists 
specialists and other workers engaged m the attempt to speed up scientific and technological development34 
This situation led Gorbachev to remark in 1985 that
We can and should achieve a much greater return from scientific research We must re-examine the
tasks of science in the hght of current requirements which are that science must be brought firmly into
line with the needs of social production and production oriented towards science All the links
connecting science technology and production must be analyzed and consolidated on this basis35
How are all of the objectives noted above to be implemented9 On 14 July 1984 Academician Abel 
Aganbegian who soon thereafter became a key advisor to Gorbachev suggested in an article in Pravda that the 
creation of up-to-date truly comprehensive research and production associations will solve the problem of the 
development and introduction of advanced technological and economic systems Furthermore he noted the 
creation of more progressive types of machinery with higher efficiency will be more economical than repairing 
old outdated equipment36
Before March 1987 no major reforms to science policy had occurred Rather variants of old measures were 
tried In 1984 a published decree had sanctioned the creation of temporary scientific collectives37 Although the 
introduction of such collectives had been begun by the Academy of Sciences three years earlier only 50 
scientific collectives were m existence by 1984 all within the structure of the Academy During the mid 1980s 
an attempt was made to create new scientific production associations in order to take full advantage of the 
scientific development potential of industry By the end of 1987 there were m existence more than 500 national 
production associations and 22 inteibranch scientific technical complexes However in the words of Aleksei 
Levin they were burdened with all the old sms departmentalism extreme centralization and administrative 
command management.”38
31 M S  Gorbachev in Pravda 25 February 1986 p 4
32. Gennady M Dobrov “The Strategy for National Science Policy in the USSR International Social Science Journal voi 
38 no 2 (1986) p 289
33 Ib idp  294
34 Ibid p 296
35 M S Gorbachev “Korennoi vopros ekonomicheskoi politila partii Kommunist no 9 (1985) p 296
36. A Aganbegian “Roots of Technical Progress Spread our Wings Pravda 14 July 1984 p 2 translated in The Current 
Digest o f the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP) voi 36 no 28 (8 August 1984) p 3
37 See Aleksei E Levin “Soviet Science Policy in the Perestroika Period An Overview Report on the USSR vol 1 (26 
May 1989) p 10
38 Ibid
8We have already identified a number of organizational problems such as administrative and jurisdictional 
barriers between science and industry that have impeded efforts to improve Soviet science and technology 
Many of these barriers continue to stand as noted m a 1984 article m Pravda m which the author observed that 
the production of the Kama Truck Plant is tormented to a much greater degree by its own lack of 
interdepartmental coordination disruptions m deliveries and defective planning —and first of all by uncompleted 
construction ”39 It has been estimated by Soviet analysts that barriers of this sort have caused delays in the 
introduction of scientific developments by eight to ten years 40
Leading Soviet scientists have tended to blame the industrial ministries for not taking up the scientists 
ideas and rather purchasing industrial equipment abroad Former president of the USSR Academy of Sciences A 
P Aleksandrov stated m April 1986 that the Academy had created 300 completed development projects which to 
date had not been introduced into industry 41 Political leaders have also blamed the ministries for not 
assimilating the new technologies developed within the Soviet Union into their production lines For these 
reasons Bons Paton president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences has called for the creation of a unified 
organizational economic mechanism similar to the interbranch scientific technical centers developed in 
Ukraine in order to bypass these administrative barriers 42 Both Gorbachev and former Prime Minister Ryzhkov 
have expressed enthusiasm for the type of organizations pioneered by Paton m Ukraine for they bring research 
and production facilities together and thereby bypass the ministerial hierarchies that tend to obstruct the 
assimilation of technical innovation 43
It is within this context that the leadership of the Soviet Umon has again attempted to link the scientific 
research establishments within industrial enterprises Currently this link is being forged through the new 
interbranch scientific technical complexes (MNTK) As the scientific production associations (or NPO) before 
them MNTK are formed around a lead institute However unlike the NPOs the MNTK can be formed around a 
branch or an Academy institute they are also different because they combine research developmental and 
production facilities from different branches of the economy thus necessitating the co-operation of a large 
number of ministries and other state agencies 144 The MNTK operate on the basis of both annual and five year 
plans that coordinate the work done with other MNTK They also possess another considerable advantage for 
their directors exercise considerable formal authority and can submit requirements to the USSR State 
Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab) for material and technical resources on the basis of 
both long term and immediate needs ”45 Yet despite these advantages the MNTK sull suffer from numerous 
problems of coordinaUon even in some high priority areas
Other orgamzauonal innovations that both strengthen the link between science and industry and weaken 
admmistraUve barriers include engineering centers temporary laboratories and factory laboratories The most 
interesting of these mnovauons are the factory laboratories set up by the Academy of Sciences 46 One attempt 
currently being made to increase the Academy s technical ues is the establishment of a number of construcuon 
bureaus that will be administered by the Academy in order to increase the producuon of scientific equipment47
Through various reforms since 1985 President Goibachev has attempted to ensure the carrying out of his 
scientific objecüves by committing the necessary funds However he has noted that resources for the 
development of science and technology should be concentrated so that they are utilized m the most efficient
39 S Bogatko and N Morozov Ways to Improve the Kama Automotive Plant, Pravda 9 July 1984 p 3 and 10 July 1984 
p 2 translated in CDSP voi 36 no 28 (8 August 1984) p 10
40 See B Konovalov Introduction is a Key Task Storehouses of Intellect and Knowledge " Izvestua 30 Januaiy 1985 p 2 
translated in CDSP voi 37 no 5 (27 Februaiy 1985) p 14
41 A P Aleksandrov “Speech by Comrade A P Aleksandrov President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Pravda 27 
February 1986 p 5 translated in CDSO voi 38 no 9 (2 April 1986) p 9
42. Cited in Kneen “Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev p 72
43 See M S Gorbachev in Pravda 26 February 1986 p 4 N I Ryzhkov m Pravda 4 March 1986 p 2
44 Kneen “Soviet Science under Gorbachev p 72
45 Ibid p 73
46 Ibid pp 73 74 See also Konavalov Introduction is a Key Task pp 15 16
47 See Kneen “Soviet Science Policy under Goibachev p 70
9possible way Furthermore Gorbachev has asked that associations and enterprises be shifted to khozraschet In 
July 1987 SCST was made responsible for implementing the khozraschet system 48 One reason for these efforts 
was related to a point made by Loren Graham who has noted that the Soviet Umon which from 1981 to 1985 
spent 131 billion rubles on science simply is not getting sufficient return on its enormous investment ”49
Efforts have also been made to accomplish the objectives of the STR through changes m the incentive 
structure for scienusts and engineers Over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s the pay of engineers declined m 
relation to that of other workers As Soviet economist Abel Aganbegian stated in 1985 engineers often made a 
salary about the same as or even less then that of factory workers 50 Today it appears that the monetary 
incentive reforms for engineers and science personnel as well as the system of remuneration within the 
Academy of Sciences are like those originally introduced in the Karpov Institute back m 1968 The result is an 
mcrease m pay of between 30 and 50 percent for engineers and other skilled scientific researchers 51
The objectives of STR are also being implemented through preliminary reforms in both the organization of 
the Academy of Sciences and the production ministries Begmnmg m 1987 reforms were undertaken within the 
Academy to reduce organizational centralization while increasing the amount of democratization In the 
ministries reforms have switched the scientific enterprises and industries over to the khozraschet accounting 
system52
The optimism that characterized views about the STR during the 1970s underwent a subtle transformation 
as the Soviet Union entered the 1980s Throughout the 1980s the Soviet leadership seemmgly became less 
concerned with the ideological aspects of the STR and more interested in its practical aspects This does not 
mean that analysts completely stopped referring to and writing about the ideological aspects of science and 
technology For example Y uni Marchuk the chairman of the SCST stated science is becoming a direct 
productive force in the society exerting a direct effect on all its components hardware and technology 
production and social relations and man himself 53 Dobrov has also that the modem scientific and technical 
revolution essentially entails the progressive transformation of a growing number of branches of science into a 
direct productive and social force nS4 However rather than focusing on the ideological components of the 
scientific technological revolution Soviet analysts now concentrate on the issue of technical or technological 
progress and the factors that encourage and facilitate technological innovations
The analysis of the STR undertaken in this article cannot possibly encompass all the various reforms that 
have been attempted But this analysis does provide evidence that the concept of STR has continued to play a 
role in Soviet thinking and policy since Mikhail Gorbachev s nse to political power in 1985 Gorbachev 
himself has acknowledged that machine-building plays the dominant, key role in carrying out the scientific and 
technological revolution ” However such references occur less often It appears that the STR as a term is 
now synonymous with the phrase accelerating scientific and technological progress ss The major difference 
between the current STR and the ideologically based STR of thel960s and 1970s is the current commitment to 
fill the scientific and technological gap between the USSR and its industrial competitors by setting ideological 
factors aside and focusing on upgrading Soviet science and technology
48 M S  Goibachev “The Fundamental Question of the Party s Economic Policy Report by Comrade M S Gorbachev 
Pravda 12 June 1985 pp 1 2 translated in CDSP vol TI no 23 (3 July 1985) p 6
49 Loren B Graham “Goibachev s Great Experiment, Issues in Science and Technology voi 4 (Winter 1988) pp 23 24
50 Cited in Loren B Graham “Gorbachev s Great Experiment ” Issues in Science and Technology voi 4 (Winter 1989) p 
25
51 Ibid  p 28
52. Levin “Soviet Science Policy pp 11 12 13
53 Guny Marchuk The Social Role of Science at the Present Stage ” World Marxist Review voi 24 no 7 (1981) p 19
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55 Goibachev “The Fundamental Question of the Party s Economic Policy p 4
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